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Professor Rodell, The Burger Court, 
and Public Opinion* 
John E Nowak** 
I must begin with a confession: I am a legal realist. That is a 
more startling confession than many would suspect. Law profes-
sors today generally claim to be realists or, at least, realistic in 
their assessment of Supreme Court rulings. But most of the same 
professors react in horror to the suggestion that constitutional 
principles and decisions tum on the personal political philosophy 
of the Justices. Instead, they base their analyses on the language 
of the Constitution, an assessment of the workings of the demo-
cratic process, or philosophic values inherent in some societal con-
sensus. These responses to the claim that constitutional law is 
simply the exercise of political power are in fact rejections of legal 
realism. 
A legal realist does not believe in "the law." Law is simply 
the exercise of political power; constitutional law is the exercise of 
power by the Supreme Court's current members. In short, consti-
tutional law is what Justices of the Supreme Court do, nothing 
more and nothing less. Legal realists do not belittle the efforts of 
those who would impose normative standards on Supreme Court 
rulings. We only demand that these moralists admit that their 
definition of right and wrong is neither demonstrably correct nor 
an accurate explanation of the Court's rulings. Scholars do the 
public a disservice when they reject legal realism and pretend that 
decisions represent anything beyond the personal political philos-
ophy of the justices. 
I expect a true legal realist school of constitutional jurispru-
dence to make headway against formal jurisprudential theories 
for the first time in a half century. The condition of society today 
mirrors that of fifty years ago, and the state of "constitutional 
law" rulings today closely mirrors that during the first part of this 
century. Though I will provide no citation for the observation, I 
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believe that a few minutes of reflection will convince the reader 
that there is more public recognition of the adverse interest of 
workers vs. employers, rich vs. poor than there has been at any 
other time during the past 40 years. Whatever else may be said of 
the Reagan presidency, it has brought home to Americans the true 
nature of the economic principle of scarcity. This article will, I 
hope, help revive interest in the realist position. 
I. RODELL'S LEGAL REALISM 
Rather than engaging in my own defense of legal realism at 
this point, I I would ask the reader to consider the work of the late 
Professor Fred Rodell. There are several reasons for my focus on 
Rodell. First, his writings make for enjoyable reading. The new-
comer to legal realism will find Woe Unto You, Lawyers/2 a most 
enjoyable introduction to the subject and Ntne Men3 to be an eas-
ily digested realist critique of the Supreme Court. 
Second, Professor Rodell was one of the few realists who did 
not back down in the face of attack by formal jurisprudence and 
sociological jurisprudence.4 Judge Jerome Frank did modify his 
legal realist position in the face of such attacks. When he wrote 
the introduction to the 1959 reprint of Woe Unto You, Lawyers!, 
he referred to Professor Rodell's attacks on lawyers and judges as 
"demonstrably excessive" and thought that Rodell might, after 
I. I have engaged in such a defense on other occasions. See Nowak, Realism, Nihil-
ism. and The Supreme Court: Do the Emperors Have Nothing But Robes?, 22 WASHBURN 
L.J. 246 (1983) (reprint of 1982 William 0. Douglas Civil Liberties Lecture); Nowak, Res-
urrecting Realist Jurisprudence: The Political Bias of Burger Court Justices, - SUFFOLK 
U.L. REv.- 1983 (forthcoming reprint of 1983 Donahue Lecture). For an examination of 
the formal jurisprudence employed by judges and scholars at the tum of the century and 
the development of the sociological and realist jurisprudential schools, see White, From 
Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and Social Change in Ear~v Twentieth-
Century America, 58 VA. L. REv. 999 (1972); and White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elabo-
ration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L. REv. 279 (1973). Both arti-
cles are reprinted in G. WHITE, PATTERNS Of AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT (1978). See 
general~ E. PURCELL, THE CRISIS Of DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1973). 
2. f. RODELL, WoE UNTO You, LAWYERS! (1939) (1980 reprint) (hereinafter cited 
as LAWYERS!). This book was first published in 1939. A new edition was published in 
!959. The only changes made in the 1959 edition were the inclusion of an "Introduction" 
by Judge Jerome Frank and a second "foreword" by Professor Rodell. The 1959 edition 
was reprinted in a 1980 paperback edition by Berkeley Publishing. The Berkeley reprint 
includes all of the material in the 1939 and 1959 editions without change. All citations in 
this article will be to the 1980 Berkeley reprint because that is the copy I keep in my office. 
All editions are out of print, and the reader may have to do some searching for the quoted 
passages from LAWYERS' if he or she obtains the 1939 or 1959 edition. 
3. f. RODELL. NINE MEN (1955) (hereinafter cited as NINE MEN). 
4. For an examination of the rise and fall of legal realism including the attacks on 
legal realists in the 1930's, see White, supra note I; Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and 
Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037 ( 1961); Nowak, Resurrecting Realist Jurisprudence, supra note I. 
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twenty years, "modify his harsher judgments."s In the foreword 
to the second edition, Professor Rodell replied to "my friend, 
Judge Frank" with the statement: "Sorry, Jerome, I wouldn't 
Still unreconstructed and unconverted I make no apology for Woe 
as it first appeared and is here reborn."6 
Third, Professor Rodell was one of the few realists to look 
closely at the Supreme Court. His work, Nine Men, is an enviable 
attempt to assess the Supreme Court's rulings in terms of the polit-
ical and economic background of the cases and the forces shaping 
the thinking of Supreme Court justices. 
Fourth, and most importantly, Professor Rodell's writings 
demonstrate that one can be an honest legal realist without being 
a philosophic nihilist.? Professor Rodell exposed the fraud of "the 
law" by demonstrating that correct or incorrect legal decisions 
cannot be defined by "legal principles." But he did not hesitate to 
go on and openly impose his own normative standards on 
Supreme Court justices. He argued that judges should be placed 
on the Court who would promote the social good as he, and his 
almost lifelong friend William 0. Douglas, saw it.s He did not, 
however, pretend that the social good as they saw it was enshrined 
in the law, higher or otherwise. 
Rather than summarize Professor Rodell's work, I would ask 
the reader to consider the following quotations from Woe Unto 
You, Lawyers! and Nine Men. 
In tribal times, there were the medicine-men. In the Middle Ages, there were 
5. LAWYERS!, supra note 2, at xiii. 
6. ld at xvii. 
7. Professor Tushnet has attacked modern legal realists as being "nihilist." Profes-
sor Tushnet does not reject the legal realist view of law as being merely the exercise of 
political power, but only the nihilist variant of legal realism that denies the existence of a 
normative basis for judging the moral correctness of the exercise of power. See Tushnet, 
Trurh. Jusrice, and the American Way: An Interpretation of Public Law Scholarship in the 
Seventies, 57 TEX. L. REv. 1307, 1342 (1979); Tushnet, Legal Realism, Structural Review, 
and Propheq, 8 U. DAYTON L. REv. 809 ( 1983). See also Tushnet, Legal Scholarship: Its 
Causes and Cure, 90 YALE L.J. 1205 (1981 ). Realism of the Fred Rodell type only requires 
the scholar to deny the myth of the law and to admit that the scholar's normative basis for 
evaluating judicial actions is neither more nor less demonstrably correct than the Court's. 
See general(y Nowak, supra note I. A realist may go from the analysis of the exercise of 
political power in the legal system to a condemnation of that use of power by an economic 
and political class, but when he does so he turns from being a legal analyst to being a 
progressive or Marxist political philosopher. 
8. See LAWYERS!, supra note 2, chapters 10&11; NINE MEN, supra note 3, foreword 
& 30 1-32; Rodell, As Justice Btl/ Douglas Compleres His Firs/ Thirry Years On The Court: 
Herewith A Random Anniversal'}' Sample, Complere Wtlh Casual Commentary. 0./ Divers 
Scraps, Shreds, and Shards Gleaned From A Forzy- Year Friendship. 16 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 
704 ( 1969). For a complete listing of Professor Rodell's writings see 89 YALE L.J. 1462 
(1980). The Professor did not limit his friendship to those whose political philosophy 
agreed with his. See Wright, Goodbye to Fred Rodell, 89 YALE L.J. 1455 (1980). 
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the priests. Today there are the lawyers. For every age, a group of bright boys, 
learned in their trade and jealous of their learning, who blend technical compe-
tence with plain and fancy hocus-pocus to make themselves masters of their fel-
low men. For every age, a pseudo-intellectual autocracy, guarding the tricks of its 
trade from the uninitiated, and running, after its own pattern, the civilization of 
its day.9 
What The Law purports to be is a tremendous body of deathless truths so 
wide in scope and so infinite in their variations that they bold somewhere, and 
often hidden, within their vastnesses the solution of every conceivable man-made 
dispute or problem. Of course the truths are phrased as abstract principles, and 
the principles are phrased in the strange lingo of The Law. And so only the law-
yers-especially those who have become judges or ordained interpreters of The 
Words--<:an ever fish the proper solution out of The Law's vastnesses .... 
To the lawyer, there is a vast difference between The Law and the laws. The 
Law is something beyond and above every statute that ever has been or could be 
passed.IO 
... The third kind of case [that comes to the Supreme Court]-the most 
important of all-includes all those disputes in which someone claims that a state 
law or a federal law-or some action taken under such a law-"offends" the U.S. 
Constitution. Here the Supreme Court has the final word. What it decides and 
what it says in these cases make up that holy hunk of The Law known as Consti-
tutional Law. 
. . . Here is The Law at its best; here are the lawyers at their most distin-
guished, their most powerful. Still comparing piles of abstract, indecisive, and 
largely irrelevant principles as though they were matching pennies on a street 
corner. Still draping in the longiloquent language of a generalized logic the an-
swers-some good, some bad-to specific social problems. And purporting all 
the while to be applying the commands and prohibitions of the U.S. 
Constitution. . . . 
And it is worth repeating, and remembering, that the alleged logic of Consti-
tutional Law is equally amorphous, equally unconvincing. equally silly whether 
the decisions the Court is handing down are "good" or "bad," "progressive" or 
"reactionary," "liberal" or "illiberal." II 
But beyond the hypnotic effects of the show that the Court puts on to look 
and sound and seem so awe-inspiring, no matter bow weak or unwise may be the 
things it does or fails to do, there are two interrelated reasons, both of them basi-
cally myths, that mainly account for the Court's continuing political power. The 
first myth is that the Court is a sort of single force, an integrated institution, a 
collective mind that operates as a unit of government instead of as nine distinct 
and disparate human beings. This myth is nurtured by the odd notion that the 
Justices do not make law when they make decisions but merely get together to 
discover what the law is, and was all along. . . . 
The second and related myth, even more deeply embedded in our folklore of 
government, has it that the men who become Justices become simultaneously-or 
ought to become if they don't-politically sterile; that they put on. or should put 
on, with their robes a complete impartiality or indifference toward the nation's 
9. LAWYERS!, supra note 2, at I. 
13. Jd at 16-17. 
II. Jd at 47, 63-65. 
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social and economic problems; that they switch, or should switch, their minds to 
neutral in dealing with every issue outside the verbal needlework of the law. A 
lawyer who has spent his professional life in the service of corporate clients, to 
whose interests he has been sincerely sympathetic, is supposed, by the myth. to 
forget it all, to tum it off like a faucet on appointment to the Court. . . . 
. . . The idea that a human being, by a conscious act of will, can rid his 
mind of the preferences and prejudices and political slants or values that his 
whole past life has accumulated in him, and so manage to think in the rarefied 
atmosphere of simon-pure objectivity, is simply a psychological absurdity.l2 
... [A]ny attempt to explore and evaluate the Court's role in our national 
history-past, present, and future-must stem from and come constantly back to 
the men who really play that role in the Court's name. It must cut through all the 
falderol of ceremony and sanctimony; it must not be taken in by the quaint notion 
that words, whether of constitution or statute, can govern, without men to use the 
words as the men see fit to use them; it must [keep] straight that the so-called 
reasons the Justices give for what they do, in their long and legal-languaged opin-
ions, are as often self-justifying excuses, wittingly or unwittingly made, as they are 
genuine sources of decision. . . . 
Only so can the Court as a political institution be seen in its true colors and 
in perspective. Only so can a light be shined on what the Justices, over the 
years--good and bad Justices, wise and less than wise, farsighted and astig-
matic-have done for the nation and done to the nation. Only so can a long look 
at the Supreme Court of the United States make sense.l3 
Ill 
To fully appreciate Fred Rodell's contributions to legal schol-
arship, we should take a look at the contributions of the Supreme 
Court to social progress with an eye unbiased by dedication to 
"the law." Prevailing principles of constitutional law generally 
correspond to the political philosophy dominant among well-edu-
cated lawyers, be they in the Senate of the United States or on the 
Supreme Court. It is difficult to demonstrate that society as a 
whole, or any subgroup thereof, has more liberty today than it 
would if Marbury v. Madison t4 had never been decided. The 
Supreme Court showed virtually no interest in civil rights and lib-
erties until Franklin Roosevelt made it back down from the pro-
tection of economic rights so dear to the hearts of lawyers.ts For 
12. NtNE MEN, supra note 3, at 27-30. 
13. ld at 31-32. 
14. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). 
15. The Court, in 1927, for the first time uphelo a first amendment challenge to a 
government prosecution, Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927). The Court strengthened the 
protection of first amendment freedoms in the 1920's. see Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 
359 (1931); Near v. Minnesota ex rel Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). But it was not until 1937 
that the Court began to actively protect first amendment freedoms. See DeJonge v. Ore-
gon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 
496 ( 1939). The religion clauses of the first amendment were not made applicable to the 
states until the 1940's. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Everson v. Bd. of 
Educ., 330 U.S. I (1947). The Supreme Court in a few cases used a "fairness" test to find 
that criminal convictions violated due process, but it was not until the Warren Court era 
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over a generation the Court retarded the progress of federal and 
state economic reforms.t6 It is amazing that defenders of the 
Court dismissed so easily the fact that, as Professor McCloskey 
stated, "a good many laborers were left a little hungrier" because 
of the Supreme Court.t7 The Court's protection of civil liberties 
has come mostly in times when its protection was largely un-
needed. The Court got around to giving first amendment protec-
tion to "subversives" only when the McCarthy era was over.ts It 
bravely declared the Sedition Act unconstitutional more than a 
century and a half after it had passed from the American scene.' 9 
From World War I to Vietnam, the Court has lent its authority to 
the prosecution of those who have gotten in the way of military 
causes.2o The Court's protection of the democratic process is at 
best a mixed bag: it has endorsed a one-man, one-vote principle 
but approved other devices to bury political dissent.2' 
The claim that the Supreme Court is a nonpolitical guardian 
of the "higher law" is sometimes based on the allegation that the 
Court has protected racial minorities against prevailing political 
opinion and oppression. If we take the long view of Supreme 
Court history, we must recognize that the claim is false. We 
should not disregard the historical effect of a Court that sided with 
slaveholders,22 invalidated federal civil rights acts after the Civil 
that the provisions of the Bill of Rights protecting the rights of defendants in criminal cases 
were made fully applicable to the states. 
16. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) {invalidating state law setting 
maximum work hours); Morehead v. New York ex rel Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) (inval-
idating state minimum wage legislation). 
17. R. McCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME CoURT 151 (1960). See J. CHOPER, 
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 83-84 (1980). 
18. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); United States v. Robel. 389 
u.s. 258 (1967). 
19. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
20. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (upholding conviction for dis-
seminating anti-war. anti-draft publications); Korematsu v. United States. 323 U.S. 214 
(1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) {upholding internment of Japa-
nese during World War II); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 {1968) (upholding pros-
ecution of draft protestor who destroyed his draft registration card). 
21. Compare Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 
U.S. 55 ( 1980) (upholding use of multimember or at-large voting systems which denied 
effective representation to minority political interests) wirlr White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 
(1973); Rogers v. Lodge. 102 S. Ct. 3272 (1982) {invalidating use of multimember or at-
large systems when lower court found proof of racially discriminatory purpose in maintain-
ing system). 
22. Its activities included not only the well known Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 
How.) 393 (1857), but also earlier rulings protecting the rights of slaveholders in runaway 
slaves. See, e.g .. Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. {14 How.) 13 (1853); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 
U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). The Supreme Court's pre-Civil War rulings on racial issues are 
examined in J. NowAK, R. RoTUNDA & J. YoUNG, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 612-16 (2d ed. 
1983) (hereinafter cited as NOWAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG). 
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War,23 condoned racial segregation,24 and endorsed the furnishing 
of separate and unequal educational opportunities for black chil-
dren.2s In the 1930's the Court began to mitigate the effect of its 
earlier rulings endorsing inequality; in 1954 it began a most 
worthwhile and justifiable crusade against racial discrimination. 
But if Bakke26 and Fullilove27 are prophetic of limits on affirma-
tive action programs, it may well be that we will have had only a 
twenty-five-year period in which the Supreme Court actively 
helped the interests of racial minorities. 
During those twenty-five years, the growth in the scope of 
constitutional adjudication has mirrored the explosion of private 
and public law rulings during the first quarter of this century. A 
glance at any of the leading constitutional casebooks or treatises 
will quickly disclose that what is now called "constitutional law" 
consists of a series of rulings from the Burger and Warren Courts. 
At one time I believed that Warren Court and Burger Court rul-
ings were related to political philosophies such as the con-
tractarian philosophy espoused by John Rawles and the 
libertarian political philosophy of Robert Nozick.2s Such a highly 
theoretical evaluation of Warren Court and Burger Court activi-
ties upholds the concept of "law" but fails to account for the polit-
ical realities of the times. The Burger Court is different from the 
Warren Court in precisely the same way that today's conservative 
Senate differs from the "Great Society" Senate of the Warren 
Court era. The concern of well-educated people, including law-
yers, today appears to be with "libertarian" rather than egalitarian 
goals. The Warren Court era witnessed a brief flowering of egali-
tarian concern in the legal profession as well as society in general. 
But if Charles Reich was ever right that America was in the midst 
23. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). It should be noted that the Court here 
used the tenth amendment to restrict the fourteenth amendment powers of Congress. Jd at 
15. The Supreme Court earlier had invalidated a state law prohibiting racial discrimina-
tion in common carrier accommodations insofar as the statute applied to interstate carriers. 
Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 ( 1878). 
24. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). For an examination of the author of that 
opinion and the social-political theories it reflects, see Glennon, Justice Henry Billings 
Brown: Values in Tension, 44 U. CoLo. L. REV. 553 (1973). 
25. Berea College v. Kentucky. 211 U.S. 45 (1908); Cumming v. Richmo.1d County 
Bd. of Educ .. 175 U.S. 528 ( 1899). These decisions undoubtedly retarded atterr,pts to se-
cure basic educational opportunities for black children during this period; only the extent 
of permanent social and economic harm to black persons resulting from these decisions is 
open to serious question. See Kousser, Separate But Not Equal: The Supreme Court's First 
Decision on Racial Discrimination in Schools, 46 J.S. HtsT. 17 (1980). 
26. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Balle, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
27. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). 
28. Nowak, Foreword· Evaluating the Work of the New Libertarian Supreme Court, 7 
HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 263 (1980). 
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of a "greening,"29 the economic and social environment has 
brought about a withering of interest in what used to be known as 
"liberal" goals. 
Because of the changed political environment, the inherently 
conservative nature of "the law" in general (and constitutional 
law rulings in particular) again protect the interests of the eco-
nomically well-to-do with whom lawyers identify. Professor Ro-
dell noted several reasons why "the law" would protect the rich. 
Not only can the rich afford the services of the always-to-be-ad-
mired "lawyer's lawyers," but most of the leaders of the profes-
sion, the legislature, and the judiciary come from those "lawyer's 
lawyers" who have spent a lifetime protecting the political estab-
lishment. Professor Rodell did not claim that the rich simply went 
out and bought the law (though in part he did claim that). Rather 
the law of lawyers rather than political action would always favor 
the rich: 
There is one more important reason why The Law regularly tends to favor 
the rich, the conservatives, the people and companies with plenty of money and 
property who, not unnaturally, want to keep all their money and property and 
keep on getting more of it in the same old ways. This reason is inherent in the 
very nature of The Law itself. For The Law, you may remember, purports to be a 
great body of changeless abstract truths. Times change, and ways of living 
change, and the facts of human affairs change, but the principles of The Law 
remain unmoved and steadfast. In short, The Law, by its own definition, is a 
stand-pat science. 
And of course it is the wealthy and well-to-do who are always stand-patters; 
the poor and the not-so-well-to-do are the progressives and the radicals. The 
moneyed groups are for the most part very nicely satisfied with the old arrange-
ments of things. . . .And they find in The Law a philosophical and less obviously 
selfish defense of their resistance to change. 30 
It is hardly surprising that during virtually all of our history, 
the Supreme Court has protected the status quo. This is just what 
one would expect from the backgrounds of the justices. Professor 
Abraham gave a composite profile of the first 100 justices, which 
reads as follows: 
NATIVE-BORN (there have been but six exceptions, the last. Austrian-born Fe-
lix Frankfurter); WHITE, (the first nonwhite, Thurgood Marshall, was appointed 
in 1967); MALE (there have been no women to date); GENERALLY PROTES-
TANT (six Roman Catholic and five Jewish Justices); FIFTY TO FIFTY-FIVE 
years of age at the time of appointment; ANGLO-SAXON ETHNIC STOCK (all 
except six); UPPER-MIDDLE to HIGH SOCIAL STATUS; REARED IN AN 
URBAN ENVIRONMENT; MEMBER OF CIVIC-MINDED, POLITICALLY 
ACTIVE, ECONOMICALLY COMFORTABLE FAMILY; B.A. and LL.B. 
29. C. REICH. THE GREENING OF AMERICA (1970). 
30. LAWYERS!, supra note 2. at 158. See also id at 156. 
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The composite would have to be modified today for the addition 
of Sandra Day O'Connor merely because she is a woman; she fits 
the composite in all other respects. The composite would not have 
to be changed at all to accommodate the appointment of John 
Paul Stevens. Professor Abraham believed that "most members 
of the American body politic would not welcome any drastic 
change" in the type of person appointed to the Supreme Court.32 
As Fred Rodell would have countered, they do not demand a 
change only because they have been sold a fraudulent view of the 
law and the need to appoint "lawyer's lawyers" or "judge's 
judges" to the Court, which is really a cover for protecting the 
dominance of the legal elite over the public. 
II. A REALIST PERSPECTIVE ON THE BURGER AND 
HUGHES COURTS 
In support of Professor Rodell's view of constitutional law, I 
would like to briefly compare the justices of the Supreme Court in 
1933 and 1983 and one area in which their rulings are similar. I 
will close my analysis with some general observations on the rela-
tionship of Burger Court rulings both to pre-193 7 rulings and to 
dominant political opinions today. I chose the 1933 Court not 
only because it was an exact half century before the writing of this 
article but also because it is the Court whose actions are most 
often decried as the antithesis of proper constitutional adjudica-
tion. In the following section I will compare the nine Hughes 
Court Justices in 1933 with the nine Justices on the Burger Court 
today.33 In a few instances I will also include a comparison of 
Justices who were recently retired from the Courts at each point in 
history: Oliver Wendell Holmes from the Hughes Court and Pot-
ter Stewart from the Burger Court. 
A. THE COURT'S MEMBERSHIP: 1933 AND 1983 
Perhaps the most important similarity between the Justices 
has nothing to do with them individually, but rather with the per-
31. H. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A PoLITICAL HISTORY OF APPOINT-
MENTS TO THE SUPREME CoURT 53 ( 1974). See a/so A. BLAUSTEIN & R. MERSKY, THE 
FIRST ONE HUNDRED JUSTICES (1978). 
32. H. ABRAHAM, supra note 31. at 54. 
33. Biographical data on the age, race, economic background and other characteris-
tics of individual justices can be found in 3 & 4 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES 
SuPREME CouRT 1789-1969 (L. Friedman & F. Israel eds. 1969) (hereinafter cited as 
FRIEDMAN & ISRAEL); 5 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (L. 
Friedman ed. 1978). 
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sons who appointed them. A realist would expect the politics of 
appointing presidents to be reflected in the persons who occupy 
positions on the Court. In both the Hughes and Burger Courts, 
seven of the nine Justices were appointed by Republicans.34 Of 
the two Democratic appointees on each Court, one was a liberal 
(Justice Brandeis and Justice Marshall) while the other was a con-
servative (the arch-conservative McReynolds on the Hughes 
Court and the neo-conservative White on the Burger Court). 
Each Court had one token liberal member appointed by a Repub-
lican president who really did not understand the appointment 
process.Js 
Both the Hughes and Burger Courts can be described literally 
as chronologically old. The average age of Justices on each of the 
Courts has been among the highest of that at any point in our 
history.36 In 1933, the average age of a justice on the Supreme 
Court was 68.1 years. Franklin Roosevelt was later to campaign 
against this group of Justices as being too old to meet their respon-
sibilities, either in terms of keeping current with their case loads or 
properly evaluating governmental programs. Today's Justices are 
even older. The average age of Justices on the Burger Court at the 
end of 1983 will be 68.8 years. 
The economic and educational backgrounds of the Justices 
on the Hughes and Burger Courts also show a significant degree 
of similarity. Of the ten Justices serving between 1930 and 1933, 
four could be described as coming from wealthy families,37 three 
from moderately high-income families,3s and three had a lower-
income background.39 Of the ten Justices who have served on the 
Burger Court during the past three years, three can be described 
as coming from wealthy families. 40 The remaining Justices ap-
34. On the Hughes Court there were two Wilson appointees: Justices Brandeis and 
McReynolds. On the Burger Court, only Justices Marshall and White were appointed by 
Democratic presidents. 
35. President Eisenhower appointed Justice Brennan; President Hoover appointed 
Cardozo. For an analysis of the Cardozo appointment see Carmen, The President, Pobiics 
and the Power of Appointment: Hoover's Nomination of Mr. Justice Cardozo, 55 VA. L. 
REV. 616 (1969). 
36. For a chart of the average age of Supreme Court Justices see G. SCHUBERT. 
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS 59 (1960). At the close of 1933 the ages of the Justices were as 
follows: Hughes, 71; Brandeis, 77; Butler, 67; Cardozo, 63; McReynolds. 71; Roberts. 58; 
Stone, 61; Sutherland, 71; Van Devanter, 74. At the close of 1983 the ages of the justices 
will be as follows: Burger, 76; Blackmun, 75; Brennan, 77; Marshall 75: O'Connor. 53; 
Powell, 76; Rehnquist, 59; Stevens, 63; White, 66. 
37. Justices Brandeis, Cardozo, Holmes, and McReynolds. 
38. Justices Butler, Roberts, and Stone. 
39. Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Sutherland and Van Devanter. 
40. Justices Powell, O'Connor and Stewart. The Stevens family. prior to the 1930's. 
also appears to have had substantial economic resources. 
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pear to come from upper-middle-class families, although a few 
may be described as coming from the lower middle class.4I The 
similarity in economic circumstances of the families is reflected, as 
would be expected, in the education of the individual justices. 
When the members of the Hughes Court entered the profession in 
the late 19th century, a large percentage of lawyers had not gradu-
ated from law school. Of the ten Hughes Justices, three attended 
Columbia, two graduated from Harvard, and one each graduated 
from the University of Pennsylvania and the University of Vir-
ginia. Justice Sutherland attended the University of Michigan but 
chose to return to practice law in Utah without receiving a di-
ploma. One Justice attended the University of Cincinnati, and 
one did not attend law school.42 Of the ten Justices on the Burger 
Court between 1980 and 1983, the Harvard, Stanford and Yale 
Law Schools can each claim two alumni.43 Justice Powell gradu-
ated from Washington and Lee University in Virginia, but re-
ceived an LL.M. degree from Harvard. Justice Stevens graduated 
with the highest grade point average in his class at Northwestern. 
Only two Justices graduated from schools that could not be de-
scribed as high-status law schools: Justice Marshall from Howard 
University, and the Chief Justice from William Mitchell College 
of Law. 
The Hughes and Burger Court Justices are as similar in their 
ethnic and religious backgrounds as they are in terms of their age, 
wealth and education. In 1933 and 1983 we had six white, Protes-
tant, male Justices. Of course, the Hughes Court was staffed en-
tirely by white males, as would be expected in 1933, but there was 
some religious diversity as there were two Jewish Justices and one 
Catholic Justice on that Court.44 The Burger Court has one black 
Justice and one female Justice, enough diversity to satisfy political 
41. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun. Marshall and White may be said to 
come from working-class backgrounds, but it is difficult to distinguish between economic 
levels on the Burger Court as none of the justices appear to have been a member of an 
impoverished family. 
42. Hughes and Stone graduated from Columbia. Cardozo chose to leave· Columbia 
and enter practice before completing degree requirements. Justices Brandeis and Holmes 
graduated from Harvard. Roberts was the Pennsylvania graduate: McReynolds graduated 
from Virginia. (Perhaps Sutherland's one year at Michigan convinced him of the correct-
ness of the libertarian constitutional theories of Michigan Dean Cooley. See general(r T. 
COOLEY. A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE 
LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (7th ed. 1903). Justice 
Van Devanter attended Cincinnati. Justice Butler did not attend law school, but graduated 
from Carleton College in Minnesota. 
43. Justices Blackmun and Brennan graduated from Harvard. Justices O'Connor and 
Rehnquist graduated from Stanford, and Justices Stewart and White graduated from Yale. 
44. Justices Brandeis and Cardozo were Jewish; Butler was Catholic. 
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necessity. The Court now has one Catholic Justice but no Jewish 
Justices.4s The legal and political establishment has really yielded 
no Supreme Court seats to the political necessity for minority rep-
resentation; the positions for blacks and women have come at the 
expense of Jewish representation. 
The Hughes and Burger Court Justices had different pre-
Supreme Court experiences, although virtually all of them held 
high-status positions before their appointments to the Supreme 
Court. In 1933, eight of the nine had had very successful practices 
prior to their appointments. Justice Stone had had a moderately 
successful private practice, but had then been Dean of the Colum-
bia Law School and Attorney General of the United States. In 
1983, seven of the nine Justices can be described as having had 
lucrative private practices. Social prejudice may have limited the 
opportunities in this area for the other two Justices: Justice Mar-
shall had an extremely successful career representing the causes of 
racial minorities, and Justice O'Connor's pursuit of a public sector 
career may be attributable to the limited career opportunities for 
women in the l950's.46 Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehn-
quist had success in private practice but opted to enter govern-
ment service at a relatively early age. 47 
The public sector experience of the Justices on the two Courts 
is also comparable, though not identical. No one on the Court 
today has had the kind of political career as Charles Evans 
Hughes had.4B The Hughes Court Justices held more prestigious 
nonjudicial government positions, while the Burger Court Justices 
have a clear edge in judicial experience. The Hughes Court had 
two former United States Attorneys General and one senator who 
had been a locallegislator.49 The Burger Court can claim only two 
local political officeholders, three Assistant Attorneys General, 
and one Solicitor General, so Of the ten Justices who served on the 
45. Justice Brennan is Catholic. 
46. Because of the recentness of her appointment, the sources listed in note 33 do not 
include biographical information for Justice O'Connor. Such information can be found in 
The Nomination of Judge Sandra Day O'Connor of Arizona to serve as Associate Justice of 
the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Commillee on the Judicial')'. 
97th Cong., 1st Sess. (Sept. 9, 10 & II, 1981). For a brief summary of Justice O'Connor's 
career, see Mann & Fiduccia, Sandra Day O'Connor: The Making of a Precedent, STAN-
FORD LAWYER, Fall/Winter 1981, at 4. 
47. Warren Burger became an Assistant Attorney General in 1953. Justice Rehnquist 
became an Assistant Attorney General in 1968. 
48. Hughes was a former cabinet member and governor. The on!~ justice in the past 
quarter century with an arguably similar political background was Ch~ef Jushce Warren. 
49. Justices McReynolds and Stone were Attorneys GeneraL Jushce Sutherland was 
both a congressman and senator and was a state legislator before his election to Congress. 
50. Sandra O'Connor was a state legislator, Lewis Powell was president of a local 
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Court between 1930 and 1933, however, only three had prior judi-
cial experience and only one had been a federaljudge.s1 Seven of 
the ten Burger Court Justices, by contrast, had prior judicial expe-
rience, and five of them had been federal court of appeals 
judges.s2 These forms of experience are of course not directly 
comparable. Perhaps wealthy and successful lawyers in the 1920's 
were more likely to pursue private sector careers or executive de-
partment positions, while financially successful lawyers of the past 
twenty years may have been more likely to pursue judicial ap-
pointments. In any event, these judges were clearly selected from 
what used to be called "the establishment." They were selected 
from successful legal practices and high-level political and judicial 
positions. The appointing authorities have had a good opportu-
nity to determine their positions on legal and social issues. It 
makes less difference to appointing authorities whether a potential 
nominee is a Republican or a Democrat than whether that per-
son's views conform to the prevailing political opinions. 
Perhaps the most interesting parallel between the two Courts 
involves Justices Blackmun and Roberts. Both men were chosen 
as safe nominees following the rejection of a politically unaccept-
able person. Owen Roberts was appointed by President Hoover 
after the Senate rejected the Parker nomination because of his ra-
cial and ethnic views.s3 Justice Blackmun followed on the heels of 
the Senate rejections of Judges Haynesworth and Carswell. 
Blackmun and Roberts also had similar backgrounds. Both were 
raised by middle-class families, Blackmun in Minnesota and Rob-
erts in Pennsylvania. Both went to prestigious schools for college 
and legal training (Roberts at the University of Pennsylvania, 
Blackmun at Harvard). Both men had successful corporate prac-
tices. Of course, there are differences. Harry Blackmun was older 
when he was appointed to the Court. Blackmun had followed his 
successful practice with judicial experience on the Court of Ap-
school board, Warren Burger and William Rehnquist were Assistant Attorneys General, 
Byron White was a Deputy Attorney General, and Thurgood Marshall was Solicitor 
General. 
51. Cardozo was Chief Justice of the New York Court of Appeals; Holmes was Chief 
Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. Van Devanter was a judge on the 
United States Court of Appeals and was also briefly Chief Justice of the Wyoming 
Supreme Court. 
52. Brennan served on the New Jersey Supreme Court; O'Connor served on the Ari-
zona Court of Appeals. Warren Burger, Harry Blackmun, Thurgood Marshall, John Ste-
vens, and Potter Stewart served on the United States Court of Appeals. 
53. See general/~· Mendelsohn, Senate Confirmation o.f Supreme Court Appointments: 
The Nomination and Rejection of John J Parker, 14 How. L.J. 105 (1968). 
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peals while Roberts had only limited government service.s4 
One cannot attribute the wavering between conservative and 
liberal viewpoints by either of these Justices to a lack of intellec-
tual competence or legal skills.ss Rather, both appear to be rela-
tively talented individuals who attempted to avoid injecting 
personal political philosophy into their decisions. As a realist 
could have told them, such an effort was impossible and bound to 
lead to apparent wavering in their voting. It is also interesting to 
note that both men wanted us to know that their apparent waver-
ing did not stem from a lack of decisiveness but an honest effort to 
apply what they saw as "the law."s6 When a decent, intelligent 
judge believes in "the law," he may actually be tom between ideo-
logical pillar and post as he searches for correct answers and seeks 
to avoid having his vote captured by politically ideological justices 
with whom he must coexist. This, I am afraid, is certainly the 
story of Harry Blackmun and, perhaps, that of Owen Roberts.s7 
B. fEDERALISM: 1933 AND TODAY 
If Professor Rodell was correct, the similarity of the 1933 and 
1983 justices should be reflected in similar rulings. To test this 
prediction, let us now look at the federalism rulings of the Hughes 
and Burger Courts. In looking at these rulings we must also take 
into account prevailing public opinion in 1983. A realist does not 
have to believe that the Supreme Court "follows" election results, 
but a realist must recognize that public opinion sets limits on the 
54. Robens served as a special prosecutor in the Teapot Dome and Elk Hill oil scan-
dal cases. See 3 fRIEDMAN & IsRAEL. supra note 33. at 2253. 
55. Owen Robens served as the Dean of the University of Pennsylvania Law School 
from 1945 to 1948. following his service on the Coun. 
56. Justice Robens's position was defended by Justice Frankfuner on the basis of a 
memorandum prepared by Justice Roberts, see Frankfurter. Mr. Jus1ice Robens, 104 U. 
PA. L. REV. 311 (1955). 
Justice Blackmun has defended his positions in press interviews. He recently gave an 
extensive television interview to Cable News Network and a press interview to the New 
York Times. See Jenkins, A Candid Talk wilh Jusuce Blackmun. N.Y. Times, Feb. 20. 
1983. § 6 (Magazine). at 20. 
57. Here I do differ with Professor Rodell. Professor Rodell believed that Roberts's 
votes in crucial decisions in the 1933-37 era were influenced by his desire to be selected as 
the vice-presidential or presidential nominee of the Republican Party. see NINE MEN, 
supra note 3, at 240-41. Based on the slight evidence cited by Rodell at this point I find it 
easier to accept his alternative view of Robens's rulings. as those of a lawyer to the rich 
whose natural tendency was to define principles of constitutional law in a way that favored 
the rich. !d at 222-42. 
I am not so unrealistic as to assume that a JUStice would not cast his or her vote on the 
basis of his or her political aspirations. It is possible that Justice O'Connor's views are 
more political than any scholar would suspect. In a recent press interview Justice Black-
mun gave credence to the Washington rumor that Sandra O'Connor has executive branch 
ambitions by acknowledging the existence of the rumor. See Jenkins. supra note 56, at 57. 
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exercise of power by any branch of government, including the 
Supreme Court. 
The political debate of the early 1980's, like that of the early 
1930's, involves a conflict between a conservative, libertarian 
political philosophy and the progressive political philosophy la-
beled "liberal" in America. The conflict between these political 
positions is as evident in the Burger Court as it was in the Hughes 
Court. In both eras we see Justices divide along the line of these 
political philosophies, while the Court as an institution reflects the 
libertarian political philosophy of the class from which the Jus-
tices were chosen. 
It is important to remember that it is irrelevant whether there 
are different groups of judges who come together to make up the 
majority votes of the Supreme Court on different libertarian prin-
ciples. It is also irrelevant that most Justices believe in "the law" 
and do not seek to make decisions on a political basis. What is 
important to the Rodell thesis is that under certain economic and 
social conditions, the exercise of power by a political ruling class 
can be predicted in terms of a libertarian-conservative model. 
Political philosophy and class interests explain Supreme Court 
rulings more clearly than legal theory. 
Before turning to the Supreme Court's restriction of federal 
legislative powers, we should initially note the congruence be-
tween the Burger Court decisions and public opinion. Public an-
tipathy towards government is greatest in the context of 
government regulation of the marketplace. In 1981, according to 
a Harris Survey, 59% of the population agreed with the statement 
that "the best government is the government that governs the 
least." This poll disclosed that 53% of the population saw "big 
government" as the greatest threat to their liberty, while only 21% 
saw big business as a threat to their personal interests. The rejec-
tion of federal governmental regulation was more pronounced 
than rejection of local government activities. In the same poll, 
82% of the populace agreed with the principle that local govern-
ment should be given control over as many services as possible.ss 
Today, by an almost two-to-one margin, the public favors efforts 
to reduce government regulation of private business.s9 A clear 
58. The Harris Survey. No. 24. March 23. 1981 (provtded by the Harris Survey to. 
and on file with, the author). 
59. The Harris Survey, No. 64, August 10, 1981 (provided by the Harris Survey to. 
and on file with. the author). In this survey a 61%-33o/c maJority favored a ··cut back"" of 
federal regulation. It is interesting to note that a majority of persons in the same survey 
opposed cutting back the Legal Services Corp. or the Consumer Product Safetv 
Commission. · 
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majority believes in the theory that regulating agencies are "cap-
tured" by those they purportedly regulate. In 1981, 78% of the 
population believed that elected officials had lost control of 
agency decision-making to "bureaucrats."6o The political tenor of 
the times would seem to favor Supreme Court rulings restricting 
the exercise of federal power and governmental regulation of the 
marketplace. We should not be surprised if the Burger Court dif-
fers from the Warren Court in the same way that our "new feder-
alism" Congress differs from the "great society" Congress of the 
1960's. The time is ripe for conservative lawyers with judicial 
power to seek a return to the pre-Roosevelt world. 
In 1933, the Hughes Court was on the verge of curtailing the 
growth of federal power in the name of the tenth amendment. 
The Court in the era before 1937 developed a principle of state 
sovereignty that guaranteed state and local governments a role as 
sovereigns in the federal system. This guarantee required that cer-
tain areas of regulation be left to state and local governments. Af-
ter 1937, this idea seemed to be as totally rejected in Supreme 
Court decisions as it was in the body politic. But the 1970's wit-
nessed increasing disenchantment with federal regulation; judges 
appointed by Republican presidents would bring the new federal-
ism to the Supreme Court even before it came to the White House. 
In National League of Cities v. Usery,6t the Court held that 
the commerce power did not extend to certain activities of state 
government-a ruling based more on tenth amendment principles 
than upon an examination of the meaning of the commerce 
clause.62 The majority opinion was written by Justice Rehnquist 
and joined only by Republican Justices.63 The majority opinion 
failed to define a legal principle by which one could differentiate 
the sovereign functions of a state that could not be interfered with 
by the federal government from state activities that could be sub-
ject to federal commercial regulation. Perhaps these libertarian 
Justices would have been more pleased by a ruling that cut back 
on federal power to restrict private activities, but such a ruling 
60. The Harris Survey. supra note 58. In 1981 a 64% majority agreed with the state· 
ment: "putting people in charge of regulatory agencies who have spent a good pan of their 
lives fighting regulations is like putting the foxes in charge of the chicken coop.'" The 
Harris Survey. supra note 59. 
61. 426 U.S. 833 (1976 ). 
62. Although the majority opinion reads as if it would conclude with a ruling that the 
tenth amendment prohibited application of the federal minimum wage law to state and 
local governments. the opinion concluded that such application was "not within the au-
thority granted Congress by An. I, § 8, cl. 3." ld at 852. 
63. The Rehnquist opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Black-
mun, Powell and Stewan. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens and Whne dissented. 
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seems to have been politically unacceptable. Instead, the Rehn-
quist majority chose to defend the ability of a state to be free of 
federal regulations when they perform governmental activitie:.. 
The closest the majority came to defining a legal principle was a 
recognition of the need to leave states free to choose how to allo-
cate scarce economic resources for public services.64 
The Justices in National League o.f Cities demonstrated the 
same ambivalence as the public at large about cutting back on 
federal power. Justice Blackmun, the fifth vote in National League 
o.f Cities, believed that the decision was based upon a judicial bal-
ancing of state and federal interests.65 As always, balancing per-
mits the exercise of political power under the guise of enforcing 
legal principles. 
We have now entered a period like the 1933-37 period 
wherein the scope of federal authority depends on the view of one 
Justice regarding the limits that the tenth amendment places upon 
federal power, the only difference being that the justice's name is 
now Blackmun rather than Roberts.66 Four of the Republican 
Justices on the Burger Court believe that the American conserva-
tive variant of libertarianism is a constitutional principle which 
restricts the power of the federal government. The three Demo-
crats, as expected, do not fear the growth of federal power,67 while 
Justice Stevens has recognized that the resurrection of the tenth 
amendment can be based on nothing but the political position of 
some Justices.6s 
National League o.f Cities has been eroded quite simply be-
cause Harry Blackmun has sided with the Democratic voting bloc 
in recent cases. In FERC v. Mississippi, 69 Justice Blackmun wrote 
a majority opinion, joined only by the dissenters in National 
League o.f Cities, allowing the federal government to require state 
regulatory authorities to consider specific approaches to rate struc-
tures and to follow specific procedures when considering utility 
regulatory standards. Justice Blackmun argued that since Con-
64. The majority found this principle sufficient to overrule a Warren Court decision 
rendered less than a decade earlier. See National League of Cities v. Usery. 426 U.S. 833 
(1976) (overruling in part Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968)). 
65. See id at 856 (Blaclanun, J., concurring). 
66. The change in the Supreme Court's position on the scope of the federal commerce 
power and the tenth amendment was based on the "switch" in the position of Justice Rob-
erts. Compare Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), with NLRB v. Jones & 
Laughlin Steel Corp .. 301 U.S. I (1937). 
67. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 856 (1976) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting, joined by White & Marshall, JJ.). 
68. See id at 881 (Stevens, J., dissenting); EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054. 1064 
(1983) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
69. 456 U.S. 742 (1982). 
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gress could have directly regulated the public utilities, it was not 
interfering with state sovereignty by conditioning state regulation 
over this subject area. The concept of conditional non-preemp-
tion sounds interesting and may indeed be the technical legal basis 
upon which National League of Cities can be differentiated from 
FERC.7° But Justice Blackmun is the only member of the 
Supreme Court who believes that National League of Cities is con-
sistent with FERC; the other Justices in the League of Cities ma-
jority all forcefully rejected Blackmun's argument.7t 
In 1983, the Court, again by a five-to-four vote, upheld the 
application of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to state 
and local government employers. In EEOC v. Wyoming, n Justice 
Brennan wrote for the majority and argued that the Court's action 
was technically consistent with National League of Cities. The test 
he applied consists of three technical threshold requirements and 
a balancing test. If a federal law (1) governs the "states as states," 
(2) addresses matters that are "indisputably attributes of state sov-
ereignty," and (3) impairs the ability of states to "structure inte-
gral operations in areas of traditional government functions," then 
the law violates the tenth amendment-unless, of course, the Jus-
tices determine that the "federal interest advanced . . . justifies 
state submission."73 
If there is an afterlife, Fred Rodell must now be laughing at 
this very elaborate and totally meaningless legal double-talk. 
Eight Justices believe that this test cannot distinguish the applica-
tion of the Age Discrimination Act to state governments, upheld 
in EEOC v. Wyoming, from the minimum wage provisions that 
were invalidated in National League of Cities .74 Indeed, the Bren-
nan majority opinion in EEOC appears to ridicule the National 
League of Cities decision. Brennan at several points implies that 
this three-part test is worthless. We are told in the majority opin-
ion that not every state employment decision that promotes effi-
70. See NoWAK. RoTUNDA & YouNG, supra note 22, at 175-77. 
71. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742,771 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part); id at 775 (O'Connor, J .. concurring in part and dissenting in part, 
joined by Burger, C.J. & Rehnquist, J.). Justice Blackmun's majority opinion in this case 
was joined by Justices Brennan. White, Marshall and Stevens, all of whom had d1ssented m 
}1/ationa/ League of Cities. 
72. 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983). 
73. The tests were developed in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation 
Ass'n. 452 U.S. 264 (1981) in which the Court upheld federal statutes regulating strip min-
ing on privately owned land. See also United Transportation Union v. Long Island R.R., 
455 U.S. 678 (1982) (state-owned railroad is not i=une from federal regulation because 
this regulation would not impair the stat-:'s ability "to structure integral operations in areas 
of traditional functions."). 
74. Justice Blackmun is the only Justice who voted in the majority in both cases. 
1984] LEGAL REALISM 125 
cient management of traditional state functions is an attribute of 
state sovereignty and that the economic burden of federal regula-
tions on state sovereignty will not constitute an improper federal 
intrusion into state affairs. In EEOC, the majority was not de-
terred from finding an overriding federal interest by the fact that 
the federal government had failed to extend protection from 
mandatory retirement to its own employees. 1s 
Although Justice Blackmun did not write a separate opinion 
in EEOC v. Wyoming, it appears that he may not be ready to vote 
to overrule National League of Cities v. Usery. Nevertheless, the 
worthlessness of "tests" cannot be masked by meaningless distinc-
tions. Justice Stevens is honest in telling us that eight of the nine 
Justices recognize the inconsistency of N a tiona/ League of Cities 
and EEOC v. Wyoming; he would overrule National League of Cit-
ies as being both incorrectly decided, and more importantly, inca-
pable of being applied in a politically neutral manner.76 
The real dispute between the majority and the dissent, and 
the nature of the fight over Harry Blackmun's vote, is best dis-
closed by the dissenting opinions in EEOC v. Wyoming. The 
Chief Justice demonstrates the strength of his belief in the Ameri-
can libertarian-conservative tradition when he states: "I have re-
examined [the Constitution] and I fail to see where it grants to the 
national government the power to impose such strictures on the 
states either expressly or by implication."77 The Chief Justice, 
and the Republicans who joined him, may be accused of many 
things, but being "strict constructionists" of the Constitution or 
opponents of 'judicial activism" should not be among those 
charges. Justice Powell reads the history of the formation of the 
Union and the tenth amendment to restrict federal powers in this 
area almost exactly as did Justices of the pre-1937 era. Powell 
dispenses with the views of Chief Justice Marshall in a footnote 
and rejects the argument that the commerce power was a central 
concern to the drafters of the Constitution.?s Presumably, his 
opinion is a testament to his unshakable faith in the libertarian-
conservative creed rather than a total inability on his part to assess 
primary and secondary historical materials. 
These cases make it clear that the libertarian bloc will revise 
history in any way necessary to enforce their political philosophy. 
For now the Democrats will pay lip service to tenth amendment 
75. EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054, 1061 n.ll. 1062 n.l4. 1064 n.l7 (1983). 
76. Id at 1064 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
77. Id at 1068 (Burger. C.J.. dissenting, joined by Powell. Rehnquist and O'Connor, 
JJ.) 
78. Jd at 1075 (Powell, J., dissenting, joined by O'Connor, J.) 
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tests if that is necessary to secure Blackmun's vote. The future 
development of the doctrine will be determined by the opening of 
positions on the Supreme Court and the political tenor of the 
times at which new Justices are appointed. 
C. THE COURT AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 
The similarity between Hughes and Burger Court rulings is 
not limited to federalism issues. Public opinion on a variety of 
political issues has set the stage for the judicial resurrection of pre-
1937 principles that favor the established economic class. I have 
detailed these similarities elsewhere,79 and would offer the reader 
only a few general observations to support this thesis. The Burger 
Court has limited the scope of Warren Court rulings protecting 
the rights of criminal defendants and virtually returned to pre-
1937 conservative positions on the meaning of fundamental fair-
ness in criminal cases.so The Harris Survey reported that "the evi-
dence in this survey would appear to support the hard-line 
approach suggested by Chief Justice Burger [in a speech to the 
A.B.A.)."Bt 
The Burger Court has also returned to a pre-1937 approach 
to defining "fundamental rights" when it decreed a woman's right 
to an abortion. But the Court denied poor women funding for 
abortions; its rulings have primarily favored upper-class women. 
The Burger Court's abortion rulings are favored by a two-to-one 
margin by the public.s2 In 1979, 70% of lawyers believed that 
abortion decisions should be left to the woman.s3 So much for the 
myth that the Court challenged public opinion to declare correct 
principles of "constitutional law" in the abortion cases. 
I cannot accuse the Burger Court of returning to the racist 
pre-1937 rulings of the Supreme Court. On the other hand, the 
Court has not sought to promote racial equality in the private sec-
tor as did the Warren Court. In its rulings on state action, the 
Burger Court has left states free to allow private sector racial dis-
crimination.s4 In rulings requiring "discriminatory purpose" to 
establish racial classifications, the Court has left the states free to 
79. See Nowak, supra note 28. 
80. See genera/~y Nowak. Foreword· Due Process Methodology in the Post-
incorporation World, 70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 397 ( 1979). 
81. The Harris Survey, No. 16, Feb. 23, 1981 (on file with author). . 
82. In 1982, t1% of the public opposed "a constitutional amendment to ban legaliZed 
abonions"; only 31% favored such an amendment. The Harris Survey. No. 63, August 9, 
1982 (on file with the author). 
83. LawPoll; Altitudes on Abortion and Firearms Control, 65 A.B.A.J. 1634 (1979). 
84. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). Cf Milliken v. Bradley, 
418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
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enact economic regulations or welfare distribution systems that es-
pecially burden the poor and racial minorities who disproportion-
ately occupy the lowest economic levels in our modem industrial 
society.ss 
While the Burger Court Justices have not approved govern-
mentally endorsed racial discrimination, it is fair to say that the 
Burger Court has kept faith with a libertarian-conservative polit-
ical position when it has examined remedial matters. While the 
Court has not moved to overturn Warren Court principles restrict-
ing racial segregation in school systems, it has prevented lower 
court judges from creating truly integrated systems by denying 
federal courts the power to attack de facto segregation,s6 prohibit-
ing judges from using desegregation plans that involved transpor-
tation of students between city and suburb,B7 and upholding a 
state constitutional restriction on state court orders requiring stu-
dent busing.ss 
The Court has clearly followed the political mainstream in its 
rulings on affirmative action programs. Over 60% of the public 
believes that there should be affirmative action programs in em-
ployment and education for women and members of racial minor-
ities so long as those programs do not involve strict "quotas."s9 
The workings of the democratic process sometimes appear to go 
against such wishes of the populace; minority race interests some-
times have spent political capital in securing affirmative action 
programs which use quotas to guarantee them a fair share of em-
ployment or educational positions. But the majority did not have 
to worry about the political process because the Court effectuated 
the libertarian-conservative position in its affirmative action rul-
85. See. e.g., City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1981); Village of Arlington 
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
86. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 f!976). The Court has 
upheld the action of lower courts which the Justices deemed nece!sary to correct de jure 
segregation. See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Dayton Bd. of 
Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979). 
87. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
88. Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 102 S. Ct. 3211 ( 1982). The Court did invalidate, by a 5 
to 4 vote, legislation limiting the power of school boards to voluntarily adopt integration 
plans. This program involved, in the majority's view, the allocation of government power 
on a racial basis. Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. I, 102 S. Ct. 3187 (1982). 
89. In 1982, 69% of the public supported "federal laws requiring affirmative action 
programs for women and minorities in employment, provided there are no rigid quotas." 
The Harris Survey, supra note 82. Apart from the need for federal laws, in 1982, 75% of 
the public agreed with the statement: "After years of discrimination, it is only fair to set up 
special programs to make sure that women and minorities are given every chance to have 
equal opportunities in employment and education." The Harris Survey, No. 8, January 28, 
1982. 
128 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 1:107 
ings. In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 90 the 
Court allowed the consideration of race in educational admissions 
so long as strict quotas were not used. Justice Powell cast the de-
ciding vote on the basis that educational institutions had an inter-
est in academic freedom which allowed for the consideration of 
racial factors.9t His opinion promotes a libertarian conception of 
academic freedom and a popular conception of the nature of ac-
ceptable affirmative action programs. It cannot be said to be one 
advancing the interest of minority race persons. Only 29% of law-
yers polled in 1978 believed that the Bakke decision was an en-
dorsement of affirmative action.92 True, the Court has allowed 
Congress to guarantee that a minimal share of public works ex-
penditures will go to minority-owned businesses, and it has re-
frained from finding private-sector affirmative action programs to 
be illegal.93 But these rulings only effectuate the popular political 
position that reasonable government programs designed to rem-
edy past discrimination are permissible, so long as the government 
does not decree strict employment or educational quotas. The 
compatibility of these rulings with modern political thought was 
best expressed by the Harris pollsters as they said: "There has 
been virtually no change in sentiment favoring affirmative action 
since 1978, when the United States Supreme Court ruled that rigid 
quotas were illegal but encouraged programs in industry and edu-
cation to help minorities and women make up for past disadvan-
tages and discrimination."94 
III. CONCLUSION 
Even this brief comparison of the Burger and Hughes Courts 
and the relationship of Supreme Court rulings to public opinion 
demonstrates, I believe, that Professor Rodell's view of constitu-
tional law remains valid today. Professor Rodell's thesis should 
be considered for both scholarly and practical reasons. If consti-
tutional law scholarship is to be relevant to the solution of societal 
90. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
91 Jd at 287-305. 311-20 (Powell. J.). 
92. La~<Po/!, Bakke's Indecisiveness Ma;· Be fls Slrenglh, 64 A.B.A.J. 1348, 1349 
( 1978) 
93. See Fullilove v. Klutznick. 448 U.S. 448 (1980); United Steelworkers of America 
v Weber. 443 U.S. 193 (1'!79). It is interesting to note that by a margin of 49'Yc to 430:. 
lawyers polled by the American Bar Association opposed Weber. LawPo/!; On AJ!irmalive 
ACllon, Judicial Seleclion. and Diversil.V of Ciiizenship Jurisdiclion. 66 A.B.A.J. 148 ( 1980). 
94. The Harris Survey. supra note 82. Regarding the relationship of the Supreme 
Court decisions to scholarly opinion see Smolla. lnlegralion Mainlenance: The Unconslilu-
liona!in· of Benign Programs Thai Discourage Black Emry lo Prevenl While Flighl, 1981 
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problems, it must be based on a realistic assessment of the 
Supreme Court. With Professor Rodell, we must recognize that 
"the law" is a fraud. There is no demonstrably correct set of legal 
principles that will dictate the resolution of constitutional issues 
apart from political philosophy and the exercise of political power 
by Justices. Mark Tushnet, among other progressive and Marxist 
legal analysts, has demonstrated the irrelevance of traditional 
scholarship to the resolution of societal problems.9s The realities 
of constitutional issues involve struggles between economically 
privileged classes and those who would put restraints on economic 
freedom in the marketplace, struggles between established polit-
ical groups and minority racial or political groups. These are con-
flicts between classes that can only be defined in economic and 
political terms. If legal scholars are to play a meaningful role in 
society, they must recognize that Supreme Court rulings are part 
of a dialectic of adjudication. The Court, as a governmental deci-
sion-maker, is a part of the political current of the times and re-
sponds to societal needs of the day.96 
Practical as well as scholarly conclusions can be drawn from 
this comparison of the Burger Court and Hughes Court rulings. 
Most dramatic of these is the need to evaluate candidates for the 
Supreme Court in political terms rather than in terms of some 
vague concept oflegal ability. We do the public a disservice when 
we argue that President Reagan should not choose candidates for 
the Supreme Court based upon their willingness to vote in a par-
ticular way on a particular issue. The President would be remiss 
in his political responsibility to those who elected him not to eval-
uate judges in this way. Objections to political tests for Supreme 
Court appointments are based on the elitism of the legal profes-
sion, whether liberal or conservative. Indeed, the rejection of le-
gal realism benefits only lawyers and professors; it does not favor 
a liberal as opposed to conservative position. The only chance for 
those who oppose the President's political policies to effectuate 
their goals is to adopt a realist assessment of the Court and evalu-
ate Supreme Court nominees in purely political terms. Those lib-
eral senators who voted to confirm Sandra Day O'Connor's 
nomination to the Court because she was a woman of excellent 
intellectual ability did no favor to their liberal constituencies. She 
95. See Tushnet, supra note 7. 
96. This method of analysis need not be reserved for realists or nihilists. Several 
scholars have analyzed the vote of the judiciary in terms of a political dialogue with the 
populace. See. e.g., A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CoNSENT 101, Ill (1975); White, The 
Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration, supra note I, at 296; Fiss, Foreword· The Forms of 
Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. I (1979). 
130 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 1:107 
did not hide her conservatism during her confirmation hearings. 
Those senators would have done better to oppose the nomination 
and try to pressure Reagan to appoint a woman whose views 
would be more compatible with their own. 
I do not expect that the realist position will ever gain adher-
ents among the traditional elites of the profession in academe, pri-
vate practice, or the judiciary. Professor Rodell was widely 
attacked by the legal profession in decades past. Legal realism of 
the Fred Rodell variety asks the profession to give up the mystical 
hold on the public which we perpetuate through the myth of "the 
law." Acceptance of Professor Rodell's views might force us to 
enter the political trenches to fight political wars. But the change 
would not be without benefits. Acceptance of the realist position 
will help the public to evaluate the manner in which it is ruled; it 
will help establish a system whereby the political process can more 
effectively operate in terms of the selection of Supreme Court jus-
tices or political responses to Supreme Court rulings. If we are to 
participate in the process by which societal problems are resolved, 
we must deal with the realities of political power rather than the 
myths of legal doctrine. 
